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charitable organizations was considered at length by the supreme court in
Amerzcan Cancer Society, Inc. v. Dayton.'s The ordinances were declared
invalid for failure to lay down rules or standards for determining the objec-
tives of the ordinances. A more complete discussion of this case will be
found in that portion of this survey dealing with Constitutional Law.
SAMUEL SONENFIELD
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS
Formal Requisites of Negotiability:
Certainty of Time: Acceleration Clauses
A negotiable instrument must be payable on demand or at a fixed or
determinable future time.' And an instrument is payable at a determinable
future tme when it is expressed to be payable on or before a fixed or de-
terminable future time specified in the instrument. 2
The above sections permit various types of acceleration clauses, whereby,
under certain conditions, the date of maturity may be advanced. An ac-
cepted type of acceleration clause is one wherein, upon some default by
the maker, the instrument may be declared due at the option of the holder.
Such a clause was contained in the note involved in National City Bank v.
Erskme & Sons, Inc.2 The clause provided that if the chattel mortgage
securing the note was "breached," the note should become due at the holder's
option. The court held that the clause did not destroy negotiability. 4
Suit by Holder in Own Name Even Though
Not Real Party in Interest
Ohio Revised Code Section 2307.05 (Ohio General Code Section 11241)
requires that, with certain exceptions, an action be prosecuted in the name
of the real party in interest. One of the exceptions is that a person expressly
authorized by statute may bring an action without joining the person for
whose benefit it is prosecuted.5 The Negotiable Instruments Law specifies
that the holder of an instrument may sue thereon in his own name,6 and
Owo Ra-. CODE § 1301.03 (C) (OHio GEN. CODE § 8106 (3)).
'Omo REV. CODE § 1301.06 (B) (OHIO GEN. CODE § 8109 (2))
2158 Ohio St. 450, 110 N.E.2d 598 (1953).
'Although the point was not decided, there was discussion pro and con as to whether
a clause permitting acceleration by the holder merely because he deems the indebted-
ness insecure, without any default on the part of the maker, destroys negotiability.
The majority of the cases hold that it does. BRrrroN, BILLS AND NOTEs 101 (1943).
5 OHIO REV. CODE 5 2307.08 (OHIo GEN. CODE 5 11244)
6Oio REv. CODE § 1301.53 (OHiO GEN. CODE 5 8156)
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"holder" includes the payee.7 Put it all together and the conclusion is in-
evitable that the payee of a negotiable instrument may bring suit on the
instrument in his own name, even though he is merely the agent of the real
parties in interest. The court so held in Kirk v. Schuameth.8
Payee As Holder in Due Course
One of the most vexing problems in the law of negotiable instruments
is whether a payee may be a holder in due course, and, if so, when. In Fire-
stone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Central Nattonal Bank,"0 the supreme court
held that where the payment of an obligation is made by the obligor's check
directly to the original payee, and the check does not pass through the hands
of an intermediary, the payee does not become a holder in due course.
Whether a situation will ever arise in which the Ohio Supreme Court win
hold that a payee may be a holder in due course must be left to speculation.
Recovery of Money Paid Under Mistake of Fact
The Firestone case, referred to above, contains a fine treatment of the
doctrine of recovery of money paid under mistake of fact. The plaintiff
issued checks payable to the defendant bank in payment for goods sup-
posedly shipped by the seller to the plaintiff. The defendant bank had loaned
money to the seller, who, in turn, assigned to defendant the accounts re-
ceivable, including invoices and bills of lading. For certain of the supposed
shipments, the bills of lading turned out to be fictitious and forged, and
the goods were not shipped. This constituted the mistake of fact involved
in the issuance of the checks by the plaintiff to the defendant. The court
permitted recovery except as to part of the amount paid, with reference
to which defendant had changed its position. The opinion gives a good
explanation of the "change of position" doctrine, which will prevent re-
covery by the payer despite a mutual mistake of fact. It points out that the
recipient is exonerated from repayment if he no longer has possession of the
funds or if reimbursement would place him in a worse position than that
which would have resulted from the payer's refusal to pay in the first place.
Directed Verdict for Plaintiff on Issue of Bad Faith
Although there is a conflict among the decisions, the majority rule is
that the plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue of whether he is a
7 OHIO REV. CODE § 1301.01 (H) (OHIO GEN. CODE § 8295)8 92 Ohio App. 442, 110 N.E.2d 803 (1952)
'See BPITrON, BILLS AND NOTES § 122 (1943), for a thorough and illuminating
discussion of the problem.
0 159 Ohio St. 423, 112 N.E.2d 636 (1953), 5 WEST. RES. L. REv. 207 (1954)
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holder in due course.1 As a corollary to the majority rule, the question
arises as to whether or not there may ever be a directed verdict for the plain-
tiff, inasmuch as he is the person bearing the burden of proof, or whether,
even in the absence of evidence indicating bad faith, the case must be sub-
mitted to the jury. Again, the authorities conflict.' 2 The case of Natsonal
City Bank v. Erskme & Sons, Inc.,13 holds that a verdict may be directed for
the plaintiff.
Duress
As against a party who is not a holder in due course, duress is a defense
to an action on a negotiable instrument. The interesting case of Tallmadge
v. Robnson'4 exemplifies the radical change occurring over the years in the
concept of duress. Originally concerned with threats of bodily harm and
criminal prosecution, duress has expanded so as to include, in the Talimadge
case, a threat of bringing disgrace upon the family by falsely accusing a re-
cently deceased father of incest with one of his daughters. Another daughter
signed the note to prevent the disgrace to the family.
Parol Evidence to Vary Indorsement
In Bell v. Vratartc'5 the payee of negotiable promissory notes discounted
them with a finance company, paid them when the makers defaulted, and
re-indorsed them to his attorney in payment for past legal services. It was
agreed that the attorney would look solely to the makers, and that the payee-
indorser should not be liable. In a suit by the attorney's assignee against
the payee-indorser, a judgment for the defendant was affirmed, the court
holding that the attorney, and hence his assignee, would be precluded from
seeking to enforce an indorser's liability against his client. Neither the
Negotiable Instruments Law nor the parol evidence rule was referred to.16
Accommodation Maker- Discharge: Extension of Time
Although Roof v. Nattonal Surety Corporator 7 merely reiterates a
proposition which has long been the law of Ohio, the case is worth noting
here because the basic authority dates back to 1910. The question concerns
"See BRinroN, BILLs AND Novas § 104 (1943).
"See BRITEON, op. ctt. supra note 11, § 105.
"3 65 Ohio L. Abs. 51, 110 N.E.2d 593 (App. 1951), affd on a different pont, 158
Ohio St. 450, 110 N.E.2d 598 (1953).
" 158 Ohio St. 333, 109 N.E.2d 496 (1952).
"113 N.E.2d 674 (Ohio App. 1953).
"But cf. Farr v. Ricker, 46 Ohio St. 265, 21 N.E. 354 (1889); Byers v. Appleman,
50 Ohio App. 135, 197 N.E. 595 (1935).
" 92 Ohio App. 295, 110 N.E.2d 159 (1952).
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